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Planning season is starting across many organizations. Leadership teams will revisit last year’s plan, refresh assumptions, and begin setting priorities for the year ahead. But before asking what to do next, there’s a more fundamental question worth asking first: what has changed enough to make parts of our current strategy less reliable?
In March 2025, as a first wave of tariffs disrupted trade relationships, we argued that companies should consider an uncomfortable possibility. This might not be a temporary disruption. It might be an early signal of a structural shift in the global business environment. That distinction matters, because the right response to a shock looks very different from the right response to a structural shift.
More than a year later, the IMF has put a number on why that distinction was worth making. In a firm-level study of how the April 2025 tariff announcements hit global equity valuations, IMF researchers found that companies more exposed to U.S. trade were hit harder, which is what you’d expect. Companies more vulnerable to uncertainty itself were hit nearly as hard, which is the more interesting finding. The two effects were of similar magnitude, together explaining roughly 20% of the stock-price decline among tradable firms after the announcement (IMF Working Paper No. 2026/070, “Trade Policy Shocks and Corporate Valuations,” April 2026).
The lesson for executives is that the strategic risk was never only the policy itself. It was the unpredictability surrounding it. A tariff can be modelled fairly precisely. An environment where tariff levels, market access, export controls and sourcing rules can change repeatedly is much harder to plan around, and that unpredictability changes corporate behaviour on its own, delaying investment and shifting where capacity gets built regardless of what any single policy actually says.
What has actually changed
Tariffs should no longer be viewed in isolation. Governments are increasingly combining tariffs with sanctions, export controls, subsidies, investment restrictions, local-content rules and industrial policy in pursuit of economic and national-security goals at the same time. The IMF now frames this through the lens of geoeconomics, meaning the use of economic tools for geopolitical ends, and notes that the line between economic policy and security policy is getting harder to draw.
This isn’t confined to one relationship. U.S.-China competition, restrictions on advanced semiconductors, critical-mineral strategies, Europe’s push to reduce strategic dependencies, and the broader rise in sanctions and export controls all point the same direction. Economics still matters enormously. It’s just no longer the only force shaping international business, and that’s the structural change worth planning around.
Globalization is getting more complicated, not disappearing
It would be easy to read all this as deglobalization. The data doesn’t fully support that reading. The WTO reported that roughly 72% of world trade was still conducted on most-favoured-nation terms as of February 2026, down from around 80% before the 2025 tariff shocks but still the clear majority of global commerce (WTO, “Global Trade Outlook and Statistics,” March 2026). The OECD, meanwhile, found that global merchandise trade kept expanding through the second half of 2025, with manufacturing export orders in February 2026 at their highest level in four years (OECD Economic Outlook, Interim Report, March 2026).
The more accurate read is that globalization has become a harder optimization problem rather than a vanishing one. For decades, companies could plan international operations mainly around efficiency: where to manufacture most cheaply, where to source at the lowest cost, which market offers the greatest scale. Those questions still matter, but they now sit alongside a second set, including how concentrated a company’s exposure is, how replaceable a given supplier is, and what happens if access to a technology gets restricted. Strategy increasingly has to balance efficiency and growth against resilience, geopolitical exposure and optionality at the same time, which is a fundamentally different equation than the one most planning processes were built for.
The answer isn’t “diversify everything”
The instinctive response to this kind of uncertainty is to diversify markets, suppliers, manufacturing and logistics all at once. There’s logic to it, but diversification isn’t free. A company can quietly destroy real competitive advantage by trading away scale, specialization or strong commercial relationships in pursuit of resilience it doesn’t actually need everywhere.
The better goal is selective strategic optionality: identifying the specific points where concentration creates genuine vulnerability, and where the cost of building an alternative is worth paying. That means asking which customers or markets represent disproportionate exposure, which suppliers would be hardest to replace, and which capabilities would take years to rebuild elsewhere if access were suddenly cut off. This is strategy, not conventional risk management, because an option doesn’t just protect against downside. It creates choices, and those choices are worth more when competitors have fewer of them.
The view from a mid-sized trading economy
Canada illustrates what concentrated market exposure means in practice for firms in mid-sized, trade-dependent economies. When a large share of trade runs through one dominant market, even formal trade agreements cannot fully eliminate exposure to sudden shifts in policy. Many strategic plans still underprice that concentration risk.
That doesn’t mean the answer is pulling back from the primary market. For most companies, it remains the largest and most attractive opportunity available, and treating it as expendable would trade a manageable risk for a much larger one.
The better move is to treat single-market dependency as a strategic variable to actively manage rather than a fixed condition to accept: understand where the business is genuinely exposed, build credible alternatives where they make economic sense, and make sure at least part of the growth story doesn’t rest on one policy environment staying stable.
This lesson applies well beyond Canada. Some degree of market concentration is almost unavoidable for any company operating from a trade-dependent economy. The real question is whether management knows where that concentration could turn into a vulnerability, and has options ready if it does.
From resilience to optionality
The Survive, Adapt, Transform framework we proposed last year still holds up, though where leadership attention needs to sit has shifted. Survive was about protecting cash, adjusting pricing and understanding exposure. Adapt was about reassessing markets, suppliers and operating models in light of the new rules. Neither was meant to be a permanent state, and organizations can’t stay in adaptation mode indefinitely.
If leadership now believes geopolitical and trade-policy uncertainty is a durable feature of the environment rather than a passing phase, the real question becomes which parts of the business need to Transform. Transforming rarely means relocating factories; more often it means a second source for a critical component, a product redesigned for easier substitution, a partnership in another geography, or a strategic-intelligence capability that gives management earlier warning when core assumptions start to shift. What all of these share is that they take time to build. A supplier can’t be qualified in a week, and a distribution network can’t be created after access to the old one is already gone. That’s the real argument for starting now instead of waiting.
Waiting for certainty is also a choice
Waiting can feel like the conservative move, and sometimes it is. Companies shouldn’t make large irreversible bets every time a government announces something new. But there’s a real difference between avoiding a premature commitment and postponing strategic preparation altogether. It also doesn’t mean freezing commitments already underway. Adaptive strategy means steering existing initiatives, adjusting their pace, sequencing and underlying assumptions as conditions shift, rather than either cancelling them outright or running them on autopilot because the money is already spent.
Picture two companies facing the same uncertainty. One waits for the environment to clear before acting. The other also avoids a major bet, but spends the same period qualifying suppliers, mapping vulnerabilities and building scenarios. A year later, when circumstances shift, the first company is starting from zero and the second already has options on the table. That gap is where competitive advantage actually comes from. It has less to do with predicting the next policy correctly, and more to do with reducing how many external events could fundamentally undermine the strategy in the first place.
Scenario planning belongs back on the executive agenda
Nobody knows precisely how the international economic environment evolves from here, which is exactly why scenario planning earns its place back on the agenda. Four broad paths seem plausible: a renewed-integration scenario in which tensions moderate and efficiency reasserts itself as the dominant force; a managed-friction scenario in which tariffs, subsidies and periodic interventions simply become normal features of doing business; a regionalization scenario in which supply chains and markets increasingly organize around geopolitical blocs; and an accelerated-fragmentation scenario in which a major geopolitical event significantly disrupts trade, technology or capital flows.
The executive team’s real job is to stress-test the current strategy against each scenario, work out which assumptions fail first, and identify the no-regret moves that strengthen the business across several scenarios, while keeping the largest bets reversible until the direction becomes clearer.
AI changes the economics of strategic intelligence
One more thing has changed since March 2025: what AI can plausibly do here. No executive team can manually track multiple markets, government policies, competitors, suppliers and geopolitical developments in real time, but that kind of continuous monitoring is now genuinely within reach. The IMF itself has used large language models to analyze earnings calls and analyst reports, and the analysis was able to detect firm-level effects of tariffs, sanctions and export controls on pricing, investment and supply-chain decisions.
A company could use AI to continuously monitor policy changes, competitor moves, supply-chain exposures and market signals against the assumptions embedded in its strategy, rather than waiting for a quarterly or annual review to reveal a problem. That creates a fundamentally different posture: closer to continuous strategic sensing than to planning as most organizations still practice it. Leadership judgment still makes the strategic call. What AI changes is how early the organization can detect a meaningful shift, understand its implications, and decide whether action is required.
Strategy itself has to evolve
This may be the most important shift of all. Traditional strategic planning assumes management can analyze the environment, set a multi-year plan, and revisit it periodically, which works fine when the assumptions underneath change slowly. It works far less well when geopolitics, regulation and technology can move faster than the planning cycle itself. What that calls for is a more dynamic loop: sense, interpret, decide, execute, learn, and repeat, so that strategy becomes less of an annual exercise and more of an ongoing organizational capability.
We made a related argument in “How Leaders Should Be Running Strategy Today,” published in December 2025: strategy can no longer be managed as a periodic event, it has to be run as an operating system, one that keeps leaders grounded in what is actually changing rather than what a plan assumed a year ago. The geoeconomic environment described here is exactly the kind of condition that makes that operating system necessary rather than optional. Companies that build that capability won’t eliminate uncertainty so much as get better at operating inside it.
The question has changed
A year ago, “how much will this cost us?” was the right question. Today the better one is which assumptions behind our strategy have become less reliable, and what we should start building now if that persists. The answer may touch markets, suppliers, technology or capital allocation. In many cases, that means building options to change course quickly rather than changing the core strategy itself, at least for now.
The evidence doesn’t tell us exactly what the global economy looks like five years out. It tells us something more useful: companies should be wary of strategies that only work if one version of the future turns out to be right.
The rules of global business have changed. The question is whether our strategies have changed with them.
A question for this year’s planning cycle
Every leadership team heading into planning season will eventually ask what has changed enough to matter. As we argued in “Don’t Start With the Plan. Start With the Need,” published in July 2026, this question, not the plan itself, deserves to come first, and the shift described here belongs on that agenda.
Before finalizing next year’s priorities, leadership teams should ask:
- Which assumptions behind our strategy have become less reliable?
- Where are we carrying concentrations or dependencies that deserve more attention?
- Which no-regret moves would strengthen the business across several plausible scenarios?
- What options should we start building now, even if we never need to use them?
- Do we have the strategic sensing capability to detect when the environment is moving faster than our planning cycle?
These questions reach past reacting to tariffs. They test whether the strategy holds up in the environment the organization now operates in, which is the planning conversation worth having this year.

